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The National Institute for Dispute Resolution, in conjunction with the Harvard Program on Negotiation, has
produced a manual entitled: New Approaches to Resolving Local Development Disputes. In addition to "when
and how", the manual uses six cases to illustrate recent efforts at mediated negotiation, outlines a step-by-step
guide to using mediated negotiation, and lists sources of support for use of the technique.
"Mediated Negotiation" is a term used to describe
the role of a mediator in public disputes. A
"mediated negotiator" is someone who is concerned
with the traditional elements of mediation such as
fairness and process, as well as with the quality of
the outcome. This term readily applies to planners.
In the following excerpt from the National Institute
for Dispute Resolution, some valuable pointers are
given about how to identify a case ripe for a
mediated settlement, how to handle the negotiation,
and how to evaluate the outcome.
When To Try Mediated Negotiation
Not all local public disputes are amenable to or
appropriate for negotiation. In some cases, a con-
cerned party or decision-maker will want to use
traditional administrative, legislative, or judicial
processes to make controversial decisions or handle
complex disputes. And even when these processes
may seem less than perfect, mediated negotiation
is not always the best alternative.
Experience over the last ten years suggests that
there are certain characteristics of disputes which
make them more or less appropriate for mediated
negotiation.
Questions To Ask Before Negotiating
There are several questions which should be asked
before launching a mediated negotiation to resolve
a local public dispute.
"Are the likely parties to the dispute numerous
diverse, and hard to identify? How much power dc
they have to block implementation of any poten
tial agreement OR of any future activities that max
have been planned?"
In situations where the parties are numerous
diverse, and hard to identify, a mediated negotia
tion may be difficult to organize, but may also b
the best way to address the concerns and secure th
support of the involved parties. Typically such par
ties are frustrated by their lack of access to othe
decision-making or dispute resolution processes
They haven't the resources, clout, or expertise t(
gain entry to board rooms or court rooms, yet thei
cooperation and support may be essential to th
success of a project or policy. By including thes
people in a mediated negotiation, all are more likel
to understand each others' concerns, and to treat th
decision or proposal as a JOINT problem requirin,
joint solving and support.
In addition, there may be parties whose cooperai
tion is not critical to THIS particular project, buj
whose long run cooperation might be useful in
number of other projects. Including them in negotia:
tions about which they care a great deal but ove|
ita
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This article is excerpted from a paper titled, New Approachi
to Resolving Local Development Disputes, developed under
grant from the National Institute for Dispute Resolution. Tf
paper will be published by NIDR later in 1986.
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which they have very little immediate influence may
be wise: their support and good will may be secured
for other projects in the future.
Are the parties willing to negotiate? Do they have
incentives to negotiate?
There is much debate in the mediation literature
about the appropriate "timing" of negotiations.
Some people argue that mediation only works when
a conflict is "ripe," that is, when the parties have
squared off and are ready to do battle.
In contrast, mediation can work not only to
respond to disputes that have erupted, but also to
preempt disputes before they emerge. The decision
about "when" to introduce mediation involves a
tradeoff. In the early stages of conflict, the parties
have not yet publicly committed themselves to posi-
tions; they are therefore freer to make concessions
without losing face. But in the very early stages of
conflict, the parties may not yet recognize or under-
stand the relevant issues. They may also feel little
immediate incentive to resolve their differences.
In the later stages of conflict, the parties may have
incurred substantial costs (or losses) doing battle.
As delays or lawyers' fees mount, the parties may
be more interested in resolving their differences than
they were months before. Thus, the incentives to
negotiate may be greater later in a dispute. On the
other hand, the parties may become more firmly
rooted to their positions as time passes. If they have
made their demands public, they may be very
reluctant to relax those demands in the course of
negotiations.
In the end, the mediator and the parties should
be sensitive to the dynamics of the conflict. Media-
tion can work in the very early or very late stages
of conflict, as long as (a) the parties have an incen-
tive to negotiate, and (b) they have not publicly
locked themselves into positions.
"Is there a controversial value judgment at the
heart of the dispute? Are fundamental principles in
opposition?"
In some cases, it may be appropriate for a judge
or arbitrator to render a "verdict" in a dispute. Where
fundamental notions of right and wrong are in-
volved, and where people are reluctant to compro-
mise these notions, mediated negotiation is unlikely
to work. Imagine anti-abortionist and pro-choice
proponents negotiating a settlement on federal abor-
tion rights policy. It is highly improbable.
But in some cases, disputes are less concerned with
ethical or moral judgements and more concerned
with differences in preferences. Party A wants to
open a shopping center and party B wants to
eliminate traffic from the neighborhood. These
disputes may end up being ill served by narrow legal
determinations of right and wrong, especially since
there may be ways to make all the parties BETTER
OFF by taking a broader look at the dispute.
(Perhaps Party B allows Party A to introduce a
variety of shops in the shopping center, in return
for an agreement changing two-way traffic to one-
way traffic in the neighborhood. B gets more vari-
ety in his enterprises and A gets reduced traffic and
the convenience of the center.) Mediated negotiation
can enable the parties to look at ALL the issues in
a dispute, and thus attempt to reach WIN-WIN solu-
tions that take the broader issues into account.
"Are the stakes great enough to justify the cost of
a mediated negotiation?"
The scope of any dispute resolution process
should be consistent with the scope of the issues in-
volved. The techniques described in this handbook
may be applied to a wide variety of situations.
Associated costs will vary according to the tech-
niques used and the scope of the issue. For exam-
ple, you probably do not want to launch a 10-month
negotiation effort with 50 parties just to resolve a
dispute over a traffic light.
Discussions involving the installation of one traf-
fic light should involve little cost and time. However,
plans for citywide installation of a new traffic
management system may warrant negotiations be-
tween the city, citizens, the business community and
local developers.
"Does the general public care about the outcome
of the dispute?"
In some cases, local disputes are purely "private"
affairs. The general public is unlikely to worry about
how two neighbors resolve their boundary disputes;
the public doesn't care who "wins" the fight, and it
won't care whether the neighbors ever speak to each
other again. But there are a host of public disputes
which affect a large segment of the community and
which affect relationships within the community. In
such cases the public is likely to care about the ac-
tual decision (or agreement) and the way that deci-
sion (or agreement) was reached.
Mediated negotiation is especially attractive for
these kinds of disputes. Unlike public hearings or
other public "advisory" processes, citizen represen-
tatives can shape the final decision in a mediated
negotiation. And unlike litigation, mediated nego-
ready to do battle
negotiation incentives
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tiation encourages cooperation and communication,
thus promoting better relationships in the com-
munity in the long run.
How To Negotiate Effectively
If you decide to participate in a mediated negotia-
tion, you should spend some time thinking about
your negotiation skills and strategies. Though we
cannot, in a few pages, train you to be effective
negotiators, we can suggest some questions for you
to consider as you plan your negotiation strategy.
Additional suggestions for effective negotiations are
presented by Fisher and Ury in their bestseller Get-
ting to Yes.
"What are your INTERESTS? What is it you really
care about most?" "What are the other parties' IN-
TERESTS as well?"
Fisher and Ury, in Getting to Yes, describe the
popular story of two children arguing over an
orange. The children's mother enters the room, and
witnessing the conflict, decides to resolve it in
Solomon-like fashion: she simply cuts the orange
in half.
The first child takes her half of the orange, peels
it, and discards the peel, saving the fruit for orange
juice. The second child takes her half of the orange,
peels it, and discards the fruit, saving the peel for
a cake she is baking.
Had the mother thought to ask the children what
they wished the orange for, she would have under-
stood each child's underlying interests. Each child
initially stated she wanted the entire orange, when
in fact she really only needed a part of the orange.
A better solution would then have emerged: peel the
orange and give the entire peel to one child and the
entire fruit to the other.
This (admittedly overquoted) example illustrates
how parties become deadlocked over positions when
they fail to express or consider the interests behind
those positions. In many disputes, there may be
several ways to satisfy each party's concerns, not just
those ways reflected in each party's opening
statements.
As you enter a negotiation, try to identify what
it is that you really care about in the negotiation.
Try to distinguish your most important from your
least important concerns. (You may find it useful to
concede on the least important concerns in order to
secure the more important ones.) Once you've done
this for yourself, then try to do the same for the
other parties. Try to imagine what their most and
least important concerns are. If you can develop pro-
posals to satisfy their most important concerns
which cost you little, you will win their support and
move the entire group towards a mutually beneficial
agreement.
"What are your ALTERNATIVES to a negotiated
agreement?" "What are the other parties' alter-
natives?"
In any negotiation, you should spend some time
evaluating your alternatives to the negotiation.
What is your best alternative if negotiations fail?
Can you win your case in court? Can you persuade
the key decision-makers on your own? Will you lose
friends?
Your "best alternative to a negotiated agreement"
(or BATNA as Fisher and Ury express it) can be a
useful yardstick for evaluating proposals made by
other parties. Should someone offer you a settle-
ment less attractive than your best alternative, you
should probably not settle. On the other hand, if
someone makes a proposal that is better than your
best alternative, you should think twice before re-
jecting it. Consider the negotiation an OPPOR-
TUNITY to do better than your non-negotiation
alternatives.
It also pays to think about the alternatives facing
the other parties in the dispute. Unless you can make
a proposal that beats their own BATNA's, you are
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unlikely to secure their agreement. Moreover, the
better their alternatives, the more effort you may
have to make to accommodate them in a settlement.
"Can you work together to BRAINSTORM some
I
creative OPTIONS without commiting yourself to
these options?"
Negotiations are often most productive when the
parties work together to "brainstorm" or invent op-
tions. According to the authors of Making Meetings
Work, Michael Doyle and David Straus, unfettered
brainstorming often leads to unusual and highly
creative solutions to problems.
But the inventiveness of brainstorming sessions
|
can be limited if the parties feel they will be bound
1 by all the suggestions they make. People will hesitate
t.\ to make creative, "off the top of the head" sugges-
t tions before they've had a chance to analyze each
suggestion completely.
Consequently, a skilled facilitator or mediator will
encourage the parties to invent options freely at dif-
I ferent points during a negotiation, if only to
stimulate creative thinking. Analysis of the options
I
can then take place at a later point in the
negotiations.
"How well are we COMMUNICATING with each
other? How well are we LISTENING to each other?"
In the highly charged atmosphere of negotiations,
it is often easy to misunderstand the other parties
and to be misunderstood by them. If you do not
understand what each other cares about, you will
have an extremely difficult time framing proposals
that are acceptable to each other.
It therefore makes sense to test, periodically, the
accuracy of communications taking place in the
negotiations. You can double check by asking the
other parties to restate for you what you just said.
You might do this in a non-offensive way by say-
ing, "I think we may have misunderstood each other.
What did you think I was saying?" Likewise, you
might offer to restate their previous statements in
' order to doublecheck your listening skills. You can
say, "I'm sorry, but I may have misunderstood you.
Did you mean to say that.
.
.?"
"How stable or secure are the other parties'
COMMITMENTS to the final agreement?"
It is often tempting to believe commitments are
firm when a very attractive proposal is on the table.
If you stand to benefit a great deal from a proposal,
you may be reluctant to ask the other parties one
last time, 'Yes, but do you PROMISE to do such and
such?"
Nevertheless, it is usually wise to secure everyone's
else's commitments before you agree to sign the final
proposal. If you can persuade the other parties to
sign contracts, post bonds, or make public promises,
terrific. But if you can only count on their word to
secure their commitments, then take the time to
study the commitments they have made. Make sure
they have promised to do things they CAN, in fact,
do. And try to make sure they have as little incen-
tive as possible to renege on their agreement.
"What is happening to the RELATIONSHIPS bet-
ween the parties in this negotiation?"
If you were haggling with a rug vendor in a
Turkish bazaar while on vacation, you might not
be concerned about the impact your negotiations
were having on your relationship with the vendor.
Odds are, after the vacation ends, you will never
see that vendor again. In addition, it is probably
unlikely that he will ever speak of you to someone
else who knows you or does business with you.
But relationships in communities may be a much
different story. In a public dispute in your own com-
munity, you may care a great deal about your rep-
utation and relationships with the other parties.
Fisher and Ury urge negotiators to "separate the
people from the problem." This is, in part, a purely
practical issue. The other parties are unlikely to
agree to anything if you spend all your energy
separate people from problen
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courteous, honest, fair
perception of the agreement
offending them. In addition, the issues at the heart
of the dispute are probably complex enough to
demand your full attention.
But there is another reason for separating the peo-
ple from the problem. It protects you from parties
who would try to exact concessions from you in
return for their good will. If you are courteous,
honest, and fair with each other, then good will
should naturally emerge from the negotiations (or
at the least, little damage should be done). Don't
allow yourself to be blackmailed into giving in
because someone threatens to cut off communi-
cations with you. Keep the discussions focused
on your legitimate interests, and away from
personalities.
In the end, regardless of how you may feel about
the other parties, most of you will have a common
goal. You will want to see the dispute resolved to
everyone's satisfaction as soon as possible. And if
relationships are improved in the process, so much
the better. The negotiations will have generated both
immediate and long run benefits.
"How will the agreement be viewed by the com-
munity at large? Will it be viewed as LEGITIMATE?"
Throughout this manual, we have been describ-
ing local PUBLIC disputes in which public officials
are involved. These officials must worry about the
public's perception of any agreement they accept,
because they serve at the pleasure of the public.
Even if you are not a public official, you too
should care about the public's perception of the
agreement. If the public feels the final agreement
is unfair and illegitimate, public representatives may
actively try to undermine the agreement.
There are, of course, many ways to evaluate the
fairness and legitimacy of the final agreement. It
may help everyone to agree on some standards of
fairness in the course of the negotiations, to ensure
that the final agreement conforms to those standards
of fairness. (Fisher and Ury describe this as
establishing "objective criteria.")
In addition, the public is likely to be less critical
of any agreement which is generated by an "open
and fair" process. If all parties with a legitimate stake
in the dispute have been allowed to participate in
the negotiations, then the rest of the community
may be hard pressed to criticize the final agreement.
How To Identify A Good Agreement
As mentioned above, there may be many ways
to evaluate a good agreement. One way is based on
the content of the agreement. Another is based on
the process by which it was generated.
Roger Fisher and Larry Susskind, in their work
at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law
School, suggest there are several characteristics to
look for in a "good agreement." Though these
characteristics do not, by themselves, prove that a
final agreement is good or appropriate, they do pro-
vide a starting point for evaluating the final
agreement.
• The agreement should be better than the alterna-
tives to no agreement faced by the other parties
to the agreement. If it is not, then the parties who
have "forgone" their better alternatives in order
to secure the agreement should have done so
voluntarily.
• It is not possible to make the agreement better
without hurting another party. Negotiations
should not be concluded if there is another, more
elegant, agreement that will leave some even bet-
ter off at no expense to anyone else.
• The agreement is feasible and stable. All
necessary parties are committed to its implemen-
tation. Where performance of the agreement
depends upon uncertain events in the future (e.g.,
elections or judicial rulings), then contingent
agreements or renegotiation provisions are in-
cluded in the agreement in order to prevent the
entire agreement from unravelling.
• The process for reaching agreement did not harm
relationships between people who will have to live
or work together in the future. Relationships
should improve as a result of the negotiations, not
deteriorate.
• All parties to the agreement are satisfied with the
agreement. No one should feel "taken." In addi-
tion, the community at large should feel that the
agreement is legitimate and that a good precedent
has been set.
• The agreement should account for the latest scien-
tific, technical and general knowledge related to
the situation. The outcome should be as "wise"
as possible.
• And finally, the agreement should be reached in
a timely and cost-effective manner. The parties in-
volved should feel that negotiations were the most
efficient and least costly method available.
